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Self-Conceptions and Evolution: A
Critical Comment on Philip Kitcher’s
The Ethical Project
Ivo Wallimann-Helmer
Summary: This paper provides a critical comment on
Philip Kitcher’s as yet unpublished book The Ethical
Project. In the first part it explains why Kitcher’s po-
sition is naturalist as well as pragmatist. In the second
part it is argued that the role ethics plays in human hi-
story is richer than Kitcher conceives it: Building on his
view, this paper suggests that ethics not only provides
a mechanism to diminish the risk of social conflict and
social instability, but it also enables the emergence of
self-conceptions. This reveals according to what proces-
ses certain particular changes occurred in the evolution
of ethics.
This is a critical comment on Kitcher’s “The Ethical Project”,
which will be published in 2011.1 Though not yet published, this
book (its manuscript) has already prompted tremendous discus-
sion and will doubtless inspire debate in moral philosophy. As I
share much of Kitcher’s view on the evolution of ethics, this com-
ment might look like an advertisement for a new book. Though
I share much of Kitcher’s view I would like to suggest, that he
not tells the full story. However, I hope my criticism will be un-
derstood as a measure of the strength of Kitcher’s story on the
evolution of ethics. A story that invites a range of further rese-
arch that, like my own proposal here, would hope to both inform
as well as be informed by Kitcher’s insights.
In what follows, I first introduce the main idea which grounds
1 This is the reason why references to the book are only made with
regard to paragraphs and not single pages.
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the view of the ethical project I ascribe to Kitcher (1): In hu-
man history, ethics plays the role of a mechanism to diminish
social conflict and the risk of social instability. Then, I argue for
a perspective on the ethical project which conceives of it as an
evolution of self-conceptions (2). In conclusion I will argue that
both perspectives might inform each other vice versa (3).
1 Pragmatic naturalism
Kitcher’s book divides into three parts. Part I provides an analy-
tic history of the evolution of ethics centred on the capacity for
psychological altruism. The capacity for psychological altruism
is a necessary condition for human beings to be able to live to-
gether in groups of mixed age and sex. Part II develops a theory
of ethical truth and progress. It argues that evolution in ethics is
to be understood not only as the accidental occurrence of chan-
ges, but as a progressive venture which makes manifest vague,
core truths in ethics. Part III provides a normative theory which
shows how we, now, should proceed with ethical questions. This
theory is defended on the basis of the initial role ethics played
in human history. To show why, I believe, Kitcher sees the role
of ethics as a mechanism for diminishing social conflict and the
risk of social instability, I will focus on the central conceptions
defended in Parts I and II. These conceptions and their relation
can be nicely explained with regard to the name Kitcher gives his
theory: Pragmatic Naturalism (§ 1).
Kitcher’s position is naturalist because the fundamental basis for
the evolution of ethics lies in two facts: First, the ethical project
started in human history when our ancestors acquired the ability
to live together, i.e.; a capacity for psychological altruism. Se-
condly, although humans achieved the capacity for psychological
altruism, they still followed selfish goals. Consequently, this made
it necessary to establish social rules and mechanisms of control
which enabled these failures to be corrected.
Given these two facts, it becomes clear why Kitcher defends a
pragmatist position: As altruism failures repeatedly occur throug-
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hout human history and the invention of new social rules and
mechanisms of control never prevent all the potential for social
conflict, there is no state to be reached in ethics, where evolu-
tion comes to an end. Every development of new social rules is
at risk of either not correcting all altruism failures or creating
new potential for social conflict. Hence, what can be reached in
ethics are social rules which, at best, solve the social problems of
a particular group at a certain time and place. In consequence,
there is no objective yardstick by which to evaluate progress in
ethics. This makes it difficult to talk about progressive changes
in ethics being an accumulation of ethical truths.
In what follows, I will explain in more detail the underlying ar-
guments Kitcher provides in his book to defend his theory. First,
I introduce the naturalist preconditions which ground the ethical
project (1.1). Thereafter I will discuss the relation between truth
and progress in ethics (1.2). This discussion will explain why, I
think Kitcher sees the role of ethics in human history being that
of a mechanism for solving social conflicts and diminishing the
risks of social instability.
1.1 Human evolution and ethics
According to Kitcher, the starting point of the ethical project
lies in the fact that our pre-historical ancestors learned to live
together in groups. Such ability must go hand in hand with a
capacity to overcome selfish desires in order to serve the group:
a capacity for psychological altruism (§ 3). Both these presump-
tions of the starting point of the evolution of the ethical project
are naturalist in kind, because they base ethics on the factual
occurrence of these two evolutionary developments.
Although the assumption of an achieved ability for psychological
altruism allows for cooperation to occur, this still cannot explain,
why human beings are able to live in groups much larger than tho-
se of other hominids. Kitcher sees psychological altruism’s lack of
explanatory power on the matter of the expansion of human co-
operation as sourced in the problem that the selfish disposition of
human beings still encounters the risk of defection. Psychological
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altruism is limited. If no system of social control for such defec-
tion is installed, then an expansion of human cooperation is not
feasible. Correcting for failures in altruistic behaviour can only
be achieved by costly and inefficient battling among the members
of a group (§ 10).
Therefore, the expansion of human cooperation can only be ex-
plained by either the development of a more extensive capacity
for psychological altruism or further capacities. Kitcher argues
for both, although he puts more weight on the development of
the further capacities. Included among these is as crucial achie-
vement, a capacity for normative guidance. Normative guidance
is the human capacity to reinforce altruistic demands by followi-
ng social rules. Our ancestors learned, in the most primitive way,
to follow commands enforced by their fellow cooperators through
punishment (§§ 11, 12). During human evolution such enforce-
ment was increasingly internalized: First, social rules were enfor-
ced through direct (physical) punishment, then those rules were
understood as being enforced by divine or other unseen powers.
Later normative guidance developed into a psychological dispo-
sition for self-control (§ 13).
Kitcher sees this achievement as an important factor in evoluti-
on, explaining how our hominid ancestors became human. Addi-
tionally, this shows why humans were able to live in much larger
groups than other hominids: Combined with the ability of langua-
ge, they were able to fix altruism failures much more efficiently
and were able to reinforce social rules, through the establishment
of ethical codes (§ 14). However, different human groups establis-
hed different ethical codes which best served to diminish altruism
failures and disobedience of their own particular normative com-
mands. Hence, Kitcher’s account of the evolution of ethics leads
to ethical pluralism (§ 16).
According to Kitcher, part of this process can be explained by the
development of the two capacities grounding the ethical project:
psychological altruism and normative guidance. Development of
psychological altruism means the expansion of a psychological
disposition to recognise other’s desires as action guiding. More
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important in this process, however, is the development of the ca-
pacity for normative guidance because it allows to correct more
efficiently for altruism failures and to ensure social stability. The-
refore, change in the ethical project is possible insofar as human
beings are able to develop their two basic capacities (§§ 15-21).
Interestingly, Kitcher makes a further proposal: It is not only
the development of these capacities which provoked changes in
ethical codes, but also the developments in ethics which had and
have impact on the expansion of these two capacities. Hence, as
Kitcher sees it, the evolution of ethics influences the capacities
on which the project is itself grounded (§ 23). On my view, taken
together, these correlative developments give a persuasive frame-
work for explaining why human beings were able to develop the
way they did.
1.2 Truth and Progress
According to Kitcher, ethical codes must be understood as
historical developments of human groups which had to solve
specific altruism failures and risks of social instability (§ 1).
Hence, changes in ethics can only be judged as serving best
the purposes of human groups at a particular time and place.
Therefore, evolution in ethics leads to the invention of ethical
codes and social rules, which might or might not display ethical
progress (§§ 28, 32): This makes ethics out to be a never-ending
story, because future human beings will always have further
needs to be fulfilled, which require as yet undecided ethical
codes. Additionally, this means that evolution in ethics cannot
be understood as a permanent progressive development during
which ethical truths are discovered (§ 38).2
A serious problem follows from this line of reasoning. One can
2 This might seem absurd, because it means that the same would
apply to science. However, according to Kitcher, at least some hu-
man practices follow the same kind of developmental processes (§§
1, 34): In technology, invention means solving a functional problem
once posed. Functional refinement of a once invented solution for
such a problem means progress only insofar as it generates better
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either think that no standard for progress in the ethical project
can be defined since changes in ethics take place as contingent
occurrences, or one can object that progress in ethics necessarily
means the accumulation of ethical truths (§§ 22, 29, 30). The
first option is problematic because it provides no instrument to
criticize barbarous ethical practices. If ethical practices occur
as contingent facts, then a return to slavery or a Nazi regime
has to be accepted as a mere change, which allows certain social
groups to fix, in an efficient manner, altruism failures and the
disobedience of social rules at a certain time and place. The
second challenge is blocked because it would put into question
Kitcher’s whole theory so far.
To escape this dilemma, Kitcher proposes that ethical progress
be prior to ethical truth (§ 32). As shown before, according to
the naturalist basis of the ethical project, progress can occur in
two ways. Progress takes place, in one way, when the capacity for
psychological altruism expands to a wider range of individuals.
In addition, progress occurs when the capacity for normative
guidance is refined. Both these processes lead to transitions
in ethical codes, because altruism failures can be fixed more
efficiently if they are linked with ethical codes allowing the rein-
forcement of respective altruistic behaviour and the obedience
of social rules. As Kitcher believes that changes in ethical codes
have had and continue to have an impact on the expansion of
the two capacities grounding the ethical project, this shows why
ethical codes are in permanent change. When a new ethical code
is installed, it influences the two capacities. Insofar as these
capacities expand then they provoke the development of another
ethical code (§ 33.).
performance. Measuring such progress does not entail any reference
to some notion of truth. Additionally, in “The Ethical Project”,
Kitcher mentions philosophical positions which ascribe the same to
mathematics (§§ 1, 30, 31). On my view, it would even be possible
to understand Kitcher’s pragmatist position with regard to science
in the same way (1985, 2001, and 2007). However, in this paper I
cannot argue for this view.
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Such development must not be understood as the creation of
expert members of a society. Kitcher sees ethical codes as an
assemblage of functions which fix the risk of different altruism
failures (§§ 34-36). Hence, development of new ethical codes must
be understood as an adaption by small steps when correcting for
such failures. This does not entail special knowledge of the wider
social conflicts and risks for social instability involved. It only
demands an awareness of those altruism failures which have to
be fixed. As a result, change in ethical codes takes place when
new functions which fix altruism failures are installed. Those
proposing them do not have to know if such changes lead to
progressive transitions (§ 29).
Therefore, progress in ethics is not achieved in virtue of accumu-
lating truths by experts. Rather, what counts as achieved truth
in ethics can only be those parts of ethical codes, social rules or
functions which survive an indefinite sequence of transitions in
ethical codes. Those features of the ethical codes, social rules and
functions which at some stage of human history enter ethics and
remain as achievements within the project, are what becomes to
be ethical truths. Therefore, it is not possible to talk of truths as
objective yardstick to judge progress in ethics, but rather to talk
about achievements which happen to be true in the course of the
ethical project itself. These achievements allow later generations
to judge which changes in ethical codes have to be evaluated as
progress (§ 38).
2 Ethical codes as self-conception
To my mind, put together, the naturalist and the pragmatist part
of Kitcher’s theory provide a very realistic and plausible explana-
tion for why human development occurred the way it did. Reali-
stic, because the two capacities – psychological altruism and nor-
mative guidance – grounding the ethical project, provide strong
explanatory power and are persuasively backed by empirical re-
search. Plausible, because discussing truth in ethics Kitcher pro-
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vides a cogent argument for why progress in ethics must not be
understood as the accumulation of truths.
As convincing, as I take Kitcher’s theory to be, however, I don’t
think it yet captures fully the role ethics plays in human history.
Kitcher explains why human evolution was possible only in terms
of the way it developed, but he delivers no explanation as to
why particular developments and progressive changes took place.
From Kitcher’s perspective, such an explanation might neither be
necessary nor possible, because such changes must be understood
as net changes with regard to a complex bundle of functions that
fixes altruism failure, together with further developments in hu-
man evolution. In contrast, I think if one enriches the role ethics
plays in human history, the explanatory power of Kitcher’s theory
gets even stronger. Such enrichment can be provided if one un-
derstands ethical codes and social rules not only as a mechanism
for fixing altruism failures and risks of social instability, but also
as the invention of different self-conceptions.
In the next subsection I will explain, why I think Kitcher’s fra-
mework motivates such an enrichment of the role ethics played in
human history (2.1). Thereafter, I will show how the development
of self-conceptions can explain at least certain changes in ethical
codes and social rules (2.2). These proposals, however, are only
working hypotheses.
2.1 Conceptions of the good and self-conceptions
Established ethical codes or social rules have an impact on the
expansion of psychological altruism and the refinement of the ca-
pacity for normative guidance. According to Kitcher, both kinds
of development go hand in hand with an expansion of the possibi-
lities of leading worthwhile and rich lives (§ 36). Kitcher explains
this expansion the following way: If the two capacities grounding
the ethical project are developed and call for respective ethical co-
des, this has two consequences for the individuals involved. First,
this development enables to expand the circle of those individuals
counting as normatively relevant. Secondly, development of more
complex ethical codes allows for more possibilities to establish
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various individual conceptions of the good. Such refinement of
ethical codes, combined with a growing division of labor, calls for
a wider range of social positions to be filled. Consequently, ethi-
cal progress allows for a wider range of life plans to be realized.
This line of reasoning shows, why the formation of conceptions
of the good and the respective expansion of possibilities to lead
worthwhile and rich lives is a byproduct of evolution in ethics (§
20).
Indicative of this process is the following: Our earliest ancestors
were mostly concerned with their survival. Their conception of the
good must have been closely linked with getting enough food and
ensuring protection from danger. By contrast, in ancient Greek
cities we already find a complex division of labor involving a wide
diversity of social positions, which need to be fulfilled. As inha-
bitants of ancient Greek cities were protected through several
institutions from risk of starvation, their conception of the good
must have changed accordingly: In these cities it became more im-
portant to develop one’s talents to best serve the community. The
new conception of the good – although it might have contained a
connection to the need for survival – introduced the importance
of developing one’s talents as part of having a worthwhile and
rich life (§§ 19, 20).
Such formation of a new conception of the good can be explained
by factors external to the ethical project and the simple fact that
ethical codes change. In our example, the external factors are a
need and ability for a division of labor. Internal to the project,
Kitcher’s theory only permits the ascertainment that a refined
ethical code occurred. Admittedly, this cannot explain what pro-
cesses in the evolution of ethics led to social conflict which called
for correction. Hence, on my view, Kitcher’s theory cannot ex-
plain what exact processes cause the development of specific new
ethical codes and social rules.
Kitcher might argue that such an explanation is neither necessary
nor possible because pragmatic naturalism only shows how evo-
lution in ethics is possible and what future development ethical
practice should take (§ 2). However, I think if one can show what
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processes provoked changes in ethical codes then two things can
be shown. First, it is possible to explain why changes in the evolu-
tion of ethics occurred the way they did and why certain changes
were regressive rather than progressive. Secondly, one can give
more detailed reasons for what direction future ethical practices
should take. To see what exact processes provoke change in ethi-
cal codes, however, the role ethics plays in human history has
to be enriched: The development of new ethical codes leads not
only to new conceptions of the good, but also to changes in self-
conceptions.3 Such changes can explain what processes provoke
change in ethical codes.
Hence, I believe that development in ethics is not only due to a
need for diminishing altruism failures and risks of social instabili-
ty, but also due to changes in self-conceptions of individuals living
under any ethical code. In consequence, on my view, any ethical
code is always tied to a specific self-conception. As I will show in
the next section, this permits detecting the processes which lead
to changes in ethical codes.
2.2 Progress and self-conceptions
At some stage in human history our ancestors developed the ca-
pacity of oral, and later written, language. Kitcher sees these
developments as providing important conditions which can ex-
plain why humans were able to form complex ethical codes to
fix altruism failures, and also to efficiently divide labor for the
fulfillment of their needs (§ 10). However, being capable of lan-
guage not only allows debate over the efficient fulfillment and the
realization of problematic tasks, it also allows asking questions.
These questions were, among other things, concerned with diffi-
culties in survival, with social conflicts, and with occurrence of
certain unfairness and death. Answering these questions leads to
the explanations given in myths, stories and religion, explaining
why members of a group at a certain time and place live un-
der the conditions they do and how they relate to their natural
3 This argument is inspired by Roughley (2000: 27f. & 45f.).
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and social environment (Wolf 1991: 115). Whilst for Kitcher such
myths, stories and religion play a crucial role in the development
and enforcement of ethical codes, I suggest that they also serve
to answer such specific questions.
Human beings who are confronted with natural threats pose que-
stions, just like members of more developed communities. There-
fore, as social groups become more developed so those answers or
stories have become more complex. Together with developments
in science, it becomes evident that throughout human history
answers to these questions have lost their mystical and religious
character. As a result, I believe, ethical codes are nowadays less
bound to divine regulation, but still serve the task of responding
to the initial questions which came up when our ancestors started
using language.
If survival is the core element of a conception of the good, then
respective individuals understand themselves as vulnerable crea-
tures at the mercy of dangerous nature. When the development of
one’s talents gets into focus of a conception of the good, then one’s
self-conception changes profoundly. Members of ancient Greek ci-
ties understood themselves as beings who have power over their
development and who can choose which direction their lives might
take. Paired with an ethical code which divides humans into ma-
sters and slaves, this leads to a conception of human beings where
some are allowed to develop freely and others have to follow their
master’s command. Members of each of these two social classes
have to develop their own self-conceptions explaining why they
belong to their class and relate to the other the way they do.4
If this analysis is correct, then the development of self-conceptions
at a certain time and place provides an explanation for the occur-
rence of change in the ethical project: At least some changes in
ethical codes took place because the self-conception of at least so-
me members of a group changed what provoked social conflict. If
it was not change in self-conception that provoked social conflict
4 Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics might count as a theory to exactly
explain these different self-conceptions and the respective relations
between masters and slaves.
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but rather the problems of altruism failure, then such a change
led itself to a new self-conception. Such a new self-conception
then might have provoked further changes in ethical codes.
An informative example for a change, driven by a new self-
conception, is the French revolution: Before the revolution it
was clear that some French – the aristocrats – were controlling
economic goods. This supposed entitlement was not justified by
effort or economic action, but only by divine ancestry. Howe-
ver, as the bourgeois started to get more economic power, their
self-conception, explaining their relation to the aristocrats, chan-
ged. They started seeing success as closely linked to effort, so-
mething which cannot be explained by divine ancestry. A new
self-conception evolved among those people of France, which re-
fused to accept differences imposed by divine ancestry. As such
evolution of a new self-conception produced social conflict; a new
ethical code had to be established to fix it.
It seems to me to be very plausible that change in the evoluti-
on of ethics can be – at least in some cases – explained by the
occurrence of new self-conceptions. However, if one accepts this
thesis and the earlier point that ethical codes are always tied to
specific self-conceptions, a further conclusion has to be accepted.
If Kitcher is correct, that those aspects of ethical codes, which,
at some stage of human history, enter ethics and remain as achie-
vements within the project, make manifest vague, core truths in
ethics, then ethical codes must also make manifest what we are
to understand by vague, core truths about human nature. This
is because self-conceptions are conceptions of us; of what our na-
ture includes. Furthermore, because the ethical project is a never-
ending story, those parts of self-conceptions, which happened to
be true, show what future direction our ethical practice should
take; it should establish or propose ethical codes and social rules
which best capture those achieved vague, core truths.
3 Conclusion: how the two perspectives
complement each other
To summarize, Kitcher’s perspective on the role of ethics in hu-
man history can be understood as a mechanism for problem-
solving within social communities which, as a side effect, enri-
ches the possibilities for living worthwhile and rich lives. From
Kitcher’s point of view, therefore, the ethical project is to be re-
garded as a cooperative venture which allowed diminishing social
conflict and reducing the risks of social instability more and more
efficiently.
In addition, I think that the ethical project not only fulfils this
role, but provides human self-conceptions. These conceptions al-
lowed and allow us human beings to understand why we live under
the conditions we do and how we relate to our natural and social
environment. Changes in these self-conceptions explain – at least
in some cases – why social conflict occurred and new ethical codes
have been established and provide reasons for what future direc-
tion our ethical practices should take. Therefore, while Kitcher
tells one part of the story of evolution in ethics, I think he does
not consider the wider role ethics plays in human history.
However, just what self-conceptions as part of human communi-
ties at specific times and places existed, can only be derived from
the conceptions of the good which have evolved, and which are
here worked out by Kitcher. Just as Kitcher’s perspective informs
the view of the ethical project I am proposing, I would hope my
proposal might inform that of Kitcher’s. Consequently, the pro-
posed enriched role ethics plays in human history does not call
into question Kitcher’s point of view, but hopes to enhance the
explanatory power his theory provides.
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